War, this is a rational theory of deterrence which provides powerful and elegant explanations for many dimensions of interstate behaviour based on an axiomatic system of deductive logic. Classical deterrence theory assumes that states can be treated as unitary actors who have a well-defined set of interests, who act to maximize those interests given existing constraints, and who do this through rational decision-making processes based on conscious cost-benefit calculations. 3 Although there are several different variations of rational deterrence theory, there is a consensus regarding some minimum conditions required for deterrence to work. A state must clearly define its commitment to defend a particular interest, communicate that commitment to the potential aggressor, possess a sufficiently potent military capability to impose costs on the adversary which exceed his expected gains, and demonstrate its resolve to implement the threat even though there may be short-term costs to itself. These theoretical requirements for deterrence have had a profound impact upon US strategic doctrine and security policy in the last thirty years. 4 In the last decade or so there has arisen a second body of literature which poses an important challenge to the classical theory of deterrence. These critics are distinguished from classical theorists on both theoretical and methodological grounds. They argue that statesmen are often driven to challenge the deterrence commitments of their adversaries in spite of the clarity of the commitments, the credibility of the threat and the military capabilities available to support the threat. They reject the unitary actor assumption, and argue that political leaders are often driven by bureaucratic or domestic political interests to use military force in spite of existing deterrent threats. They also reject the rationality assumption, and draw on the literature in organizational theory and social psychology to explain why statesmen do not always engage in the type of information search and careful cost-benefit calculations required by rational expected-utility theory. Moreover, whereas the classical theorists proceed deductively and make little effort to subject their propositions to empirical test, these other scholars generally proceed inductively and rely heavily on intensive case studies of state behaviour in deterrence situations. They conclude that states frequently do not act consistently with the predictions of classical deter-War, this is a rational theory of deterrence which provides powerful and elegant explanations for many dimensions of interstate behaviour based on an axiomatic system of deductive logic. Classical deterrence theory assumes that states can be treated as unitary actors who have a well-defined set of interests, who act to maximize those interests given existing constraints, and who do this through rational decision-making processes based on conscious cost-benefit calculations. 3 Although there are several different variations of rational deterrence theory, there is a consensus regarding some minimum conditions required for deterrence to work. A state must clearly define its commitment to defend a particular interest, communicate that commitment to the potential aggressor, possess a sufficiently potent military capability to impose costs on the adversary which exceed his expected gains, and demonstrate its resolve to implement the threat even though there may be short-term costs to itself. These theoretical requirements for deterrence have had a profound impact upon US strategic doctrine and security policy in the last thirty years. 4 In the last decade or so there has arisen a second body of literature which poses an important challenge to the classical theory of deterrence. These critics are distinguished from classical theorists on both theoretical and methodological grounds. They argue that statesmen are often driven to challenge the deterrence commitments of their adversaries in spite of the clarity of the commitments, the credibility of the threat and the military capabilities available to support the threat. They reject the unitary actor assumption, and argue that political leaders are often driven by bureaucratic or domestic political interests to use military force in spite of existing deterrent threats. They also reject the rationality assumption, and draw on the literature in organizational theory and social psychology to explain why statesmen do not always engage in the type of information search and careful cost-benefit calculations required by rational expected-utility theory. Moreover, whereas the classical theorists proceed deductively and make little effort to subject their propositions to empirical test, these other scholars generally proceed inductively and rely heavily on intensive case studies of state behaviour in deterrence situations. They conclude that states frequently do not act consistently with the predictions of classical deter-War, this is a rational theory of deterrence which provides powerful and elegant explanations for many dimensions of interstate behaviour based on an axiomatic system of deductive logic. Classical deterrence theory assumes that states can be treated as unitary actors who have a well-defined set of interests, who act to maximize those interests given existing constraints, and who do this through rational decision-making processes based on conscious cost-benefit calculations. 3 Although there are several different variations of rational deterrence theory, there is a consensus regarding some minimum conditions required for deterrence to work. A state must clearly define its commitment to defend a particular interest, communicate that commitment to the potential aggressor, possess a sufficiently potent military capability to impose costs on the adversary which exceed his expected gains, and demonstrate its resolve to implement the threat even though there may be short-term costs to itself. These theoretical requirements for deterrence have had a profound impact upon US strategic doctrine and security policy in the last thirty years. 4 In the last decade or so there has arisen a second body of literature which poses an important challenge to the classical theory of deterrence. These critics are distinguished from classical theorists on both theoretical and methodological grounds. They argue that statesmen are often driven to challenge the deterrence commitments of their adversaries in spite of the clarity of the commitments, the credibility of the threat and the military capabilities available to support the threat. They reject the unitary actor assumption, and argue that political leaders are often driven by bureaucratic or domestic political interests to use military force in spite of existing deterrent threats. They also reject the rationality assumption, and draw on the literature in organizational theory and social psychology to explain why statesmen do not always engage in the type of information search and careful cost-benefit calculations required by rational expected-utility theory. Moreover, whereas the classical theorists proceed deductively and make little effort to subject their propositions to empirical test, these other scholars generally proceed inductively and rely heavily on intensive case studies of state behaviour in deterrence situations. They conclude that states frequently do not act consistently with the predictions of classical deter-rence theory. Much of the case-study literature on deterrence is also very concerned with the policy implications of theory, and argues that a military doctrine based on the flawed assumptions of rational deterrence theory runs unacceptable risks in the nuclear age.5
There is still another body of literature which addresses the question of when deterrence works. This is distinguished by its methodological approach rather than theoretical orientation, and belongs to the tradition of quantitative empirical research in international relations. Its aim is to construct hypotheses regarding the conditions for deterrence success and failure, to operationalize those hyotheses with quantitative indicators of the key theoretical concepts, and to subject those hypotheses to systematic empirical test based on large-N aggregate studies. Most of this work has employed aggregate data methods, but events data have also been utilized. 6 Most of the hypotheses investigated by the quantitative empirical literature are consistent with the Realpolitik assumptions underlying classical deterrence theory. The key variables include the dyadic balance of military power, alliance patterns, political commitments, trade patterns, and other variables reflecting state interests, capabilities and commitments. The quantitative literature is more concerned with the hypotheses themselves and with the empirical validity of those hypotheses, than with the formal theoretical apparatus from which they are derived. There is no reason in principle why the psychological or domestic political concerns of the case study literature cannot be incorporated into empirical models of deterrence, and in fact the most recent quantitative empirical studies have done precisely that.7
Both classical deterrence theory and the case study literature on deterrence will be familiar to most readers, and there is little need for a comprehensive survey of that literature here. Quantitative empirical studies of deterrence are much more recent and less familiar, however, and have not been reviewed in any systematic way. Consequently, this article will focus primarily on the quantitative empirical literature on deterrence, with particular emphasis on the conditions rence theory. Much of the case-study literature on deterrence is also very concerned with the policy implications of theory, and argues that a military doctrine based on the flawed assumptions of rational deterrence theory runs unacceptable risks in the nuclear age.5
Both classical deterrence theory and the case study literature on deterrence will be familiar to most readers, and there is little need for a comprehensive survey of that literature here. Quantitative empirical studies of deterrence are much more recent and less familiar, however, and have not been reviewed in any systematic way. Consequently, this article will focus primarily on the quantitative empirical literature on deterrence, with particular emphasis on the conditions under which deterrent threats are likely to succeed. In examining this literature I will attempt to place its major assumptions and findings in the context of the broader theoretical and empirical literature on deterrence. I will note where the findings of the quantitative studies reinforce those from the case study literature and where those findings are inconsistent.
In spite of its importance, this question of when deterrence works has not received extensive treatment in the quantitative literature on international relations. The research most directly related to this question is that of Huth and Russett on extended deterrence, following up on Russett's influential 1963 study,8 and their work will be examined in detail. There has also been some interesting research on military threats and crisis behaviour which does not focus specifically on deterrence but which has important implications for the question of the effectiveness of deterrent threats. This includes some of the work by North and his colleagues on the 1914 project; by Singer, Maoz, Leng and others on recent extensions of the Correlates of War project; and by Karsten et al. in their historical study of military threats. I will examine these studies here and attempt to draw out their implications for the effectiveness of deterrence threats.9
The empirical findings from these studies cannot be easily summarized. They are sensitive to the empirical domain of the analysis, the selection of cases, the operational indicators of the independent and dependent variables, and to other aspects of the research design. Consequently, a meaningful analysis requires the specification of the theoretical questions towards which each study is directed and a discussion of the methodology by which it is carried out. For this reason I will examine a few important studies in some detail rather than present a laundry list of the empirical results of every study having something to do with deterrence.
One important theme in the literature concerns the relative importance of the dyadic balance of military capabilities in deterrence crises, and I will begin with that question. I will then examine in greater detail the ongoing research program of Russett and Huth, which deals with a wide range of hypotheses regarding extended deterrence. Other empirical literature will be discussed where it has an important bearing on these studies.
Before we begin it is necessary to make an important theoretical distinction between 'general deterrence' and 'immediate deterrence'. Immediate deterrence refers to the relationship between opposing states 'where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it', whereas general deterrence refers to adversaries who 'maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere 8 Bruce M. Russett, 'The Calculus of Deterrence', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7 (1963), 97-109. 9 Specific studies will be cited as they are examined. Because many of these studies were not designed specifically and solely to answer the theoretical question of the conditions affecting the success or failure of deterrence, my analysis of the bearing of these studies on that question should not be interpreted as a judgement of their overall merit. under which deterrent threats are likely to succeed. In examining this literature I will attempt to place its major assumptions and findings in the context of the broader theoretical and empirical literature on deterrence. I will note where the findings of the quantitative studies reinforce those from the case study literature and where those findings are inconsistent.
Before we begin it is necessary to make an important theoretical distinction between 'general deterrence' and 'immediate deterrence'. Immediate deterrence refers to the relationship between opposing states 'where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it', whereas general deterrence refers to adversaries who 'maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere under which deterrent threats are likely to succeed. In examining this literature I will attempt to place its major assumptions and findings in the context of the broader theoretical and empirical literature on deterrence. I will note where the findings of the quantitative studies reinforce those from the case study literature and where those findings are inconsistent.
Before we begin it is necessary to make an important theoretical distinction between 'general deterrence' and 'immediate deterrence'. Immediate deterrence refers to the relationship between opposing states 'where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it', whereas general deterrence refers to adversaries who 'maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere 8 Bruce M. Russett, 'The Calculus of Deterrence', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7 (1963), 97-109. 9 Specific studies will be cited as they are examined. Because many of these studies were not designed specifically and solely to answer the theoretical question of the conditions affecting the success or failure of deterrence, my analysis of the bearing of these studies on that question should not be interpreted as a judgement of their overall merit. near mounting an attack'.10 Immediate deterrence assumes the existence of a crisis or dispute in which military threats have been made and hence assumes the existence of the underlying conditions generating the crisis. General deterrence makes no assumption that there exists a crisis or serious dispute, that one state is seriously considering an attack on the other, or that a specific deterrent threat has been issued. Whereas general deterrence is concerned with the sources of crises as well as the conditions for crisis stability (stability within a crisis), immediate deterrence is concerned only with crisis stability. This study, and in fact most of the empirical literature on deterrence, is concerned with immediate deterrence rather than general deterrence, because the very question of the conditions under which deterrent threats are effective assumes the prior existence of a threat. As we will see, however, this distinction between general and immediate deterrence raises a difficult analytical problem.
THE ROLE OF CAPABILITIES
In spite of the numerous preconditions for successful deterrence, there are some proponents of a 'power politics' model who focus primarily on military capabilities alone as the central element of deterrence. They assume that a state will not initiate a war that it expects to lose, so that the defender's possession of superior military capabilities (along with the adversary's recognition of that superiority) is a sufficient condition for deterrence. This proposition is reflected in the old adage si vis pacem para bellum (if you want peace prepare for war), which for centuries has been used by statesmen to justify the expansion of their armaments programmes.
This proposition seems to imply sufficient rather than necessary conditions for deterrence: it does not say that the strong will always attack the weak, but only that the weak will never attack the strong (unless they have help from allies). Some adopt a stronger version of the hypothesis, however, and suggest that superior capabilities are a necessary as well as sufficient condition for deterrence, that the strong will attack the weak if there is nothing to prevent them from doing so. This is implied by the Athenians' argument to the Melians that 'the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept'.11
There are enough situations in which the strong do not attack the weak in spite of their ability to do so, as well as logical flaws in the argument, to cast serious doubt on the stronger version of the peace-through-strength hypothesis. Even the weaker version of the hypothesis, however, is beset by logical problems in addition to some important contradictory cases. One problem is that it fails to incorporate the interests of the actors involved in the conflict. It is reasonable near mounting an attack'.10 Immediate deterrence assumes the existence of a crisis or dispute in which military threats have been made and hence assumes the existence of the underlying conditions generating the crisis. General deterrence makes no assumption that there exists a crisis or serious dispute, that one state is seriously considering an attack on the other, or that a specific deterrent threat has been issued. Whereas general deterrence is concerned with the sources of crises as well as the conditions for crisis stability (stability within a crisis), immediate deterrence is concerned only with crisis stability. This study, and in fact most of the empirical literature on deterrence, is concerned with immediate deterrence rather than general deterrence, because the very question of the conditions under which deterrent threats are effective assumes the prior existence of a threat. As we will see, however, this distinction between general and immediate deterrence raises a difficult analytical problem.
There are enough situations in which the strong do not attack the weak in spite of their ability to do so, as well as logical flaws in the argument, to cast serious doubt on the stronger version of the peace-through-strength hypothesis. Even the weaker version of the hypothesis, however, is beset by logical problems in addition to some important contradictory cases. One problem is that it fails to incorporate the interests of the actors involved in the conflict. It is reasonable In spite of these theoretical problems, the power politics hypothesis of deterrence has numerous advocates. The popularity of the hypothesis is suggested, perhaps, by the number of empirical studies designed to test it. 13 The North 1914 Studies A fairly early study that has some bearing on the question of the importance of capabilities for the effectiveness of deterrent threats is the 1961 article by Zinnes, North and Koch, 'Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War'.14 Part of North's 1914 Project, this study uses content analysis of a fairly complete set of official diplomatic documents to examine the hypothesis that a state will not initiate a war if it perceives its (or its coalition's) military capabilities to be 'significantly' inferior to those of its adversary.
The to assume that states consider the likely costs and benefits from war as well as the probability of victory based on the balance of dyadic capabilities, so that actions involving a less-than-even odds of winning can be rationally undertaken if their potential benefits are sufficiently great and if there are some limits on the costs of defeat.'2 In addition, the costs and benefits of war should be compared to those of other alternatives, including the alternative of doing nothing. Consequently, weaker states may rationally initiate war if they believe that the existing status quo is so unacceptable that they have nothing to lose, or that an attack by the adversary is imminent and that there are advantages in striking first.
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They include over a hundred independent variables, but our focus here is restricted to those relating to the role of military capabilities.28 Karsten, Howell and Allen find that the balance of objective capabilities does not significantly affect the outcome of the crisis, and weaker or smaller states are no more likely than stronger states to yield to threats. But if the target perceives that the threatener has the capability to inflict serious damage (in absolute terms, regardless of the damage the target could inflict), threats tend to succeed. On the other hand, the threatener's perceptions of the target's capabilities tend to be far less important (although this has changed in the nuclear age). In fact, there is a modest tendency, at least in the pre-1945 period, for threats to fail when the threatener perceived itself as superior and to succeed when it perceived itself as inferior. This is explained in terms of the enormous importance of resolve and the underlying interests at stake, though the threatener's perception of the target's resolve is more important than the target's perception of the target's resolve. Karsten, Howell and Allen criticize the common focus on the credibility, resolve and signalling of the threatener and the common failure to recognize the importance of target goals and interests.29
The validity of many of the Karsten, Howell and Allen findings is limited by some rather serious flaws in their research design. There is no clear theoretical framework guiding the study, and the cases are not systematically selected from any well-defined population, so that it is difficult to generalize beyond the specific cases included in the study. For a more sophisticated large-N study of the efficacy of military threats, and one which focuses explicitly on deterrent threats, we turn to the Russett-Huth research programme on extended deterrence.
THE RUSSETT AND HUTH STUDIES
Of all the empirical studies of deterrence, those by Russett and Huth are in many respects the most relevant for our purposes. They focus explicitly on deterrence 28 They include over a hundred independent variables, but our focus here is restricted to those relating to the role of military capabilities.28 Karsten, Howell and Allen find that the balance of objective capabilities does not significantly affect the outcome of the crisis, and weaker or smaller states are no more likely than stronger states to yield to threats. But if the target perceives that the threatener has the capability to inflict serious damage (in absolute terms, regardless of the damage the target could inflict), threats tend to succeed. On the other hand, the threatener's perceptions of the target's capabilities tend to be far less important (although this has changed in the nuclear age). In fact, there is a modest tendency, at least in the pre-1945 period, for threats to fail when the threatener perceived itself as superior and to succeed when it perceived itself as inferior. This is explained in terms of the enormous importance of resolve and the underlying interests at stake, though the threatener's perception of the target's resolve is more important than the target's perception of the target's resolve. Karsten, Howell and Allen criticize the common focus on the credibility, resolve and signalling of the threatener and the common failure to recognize the importance of target goals and interests.29
The validity of many of the Karsten, Howell and Allen findings is limited by some rather serious flaws in their research design. There is no clear theoretical framework guiding the study, and the cases are not systematically selected from any well-defined population, so that it is difficult to generalize beyond the specific cases included in the study. For a more sophisticated large-N study of the efficacy of military threats, and one which focuses explicitly on deterrent threats, we turn to the Russett-Huth research programme on extended deterrence. They include over a hundred independent variables, but our focus here is restricted to those relating to the role of military capabilities.28 Karsten, Howell and Allen find that the balance of objective capabilities does not significantly affect the outcome of the crisis, and weaker or smaller states are no more likely than stronger states to yield to threats. But if the target perceives that the threatener has the capability to inflict serious damage (in absolute terms, regardless of the damage the target could inflict), threats tend to succeed. On the other hand, the threatener's perceptions of the target's capabilities tend to be far less important (although this has changed in the nuclear age). In fact, there is a modest tendency, at least in the pre-1945 period, for threats to fail when the threatener perceived itself as superior and to succeed when it perceived itself as inferior. This is explained in terms of the enormous importance of resolve and the underlying interests at stake, though the threatener's perception of the target's resolve is more important than the target's perception of the target's resolve. Karsten, Howell and Allen criticize the common focus on the credibility, resolve and signalling of the threatener and the common failure to recognize the importance of target goals and interests.29
The validity of many of the Karsten, Howell and Allen findings is limited by some rather serious flaws in their research design. There is no clear theoretical framework guiding the study, and the cases are not systematically selected from any well-defined population, so that it is difficult to generalize beyond the specific cases included in the study. For a more sophisticated large-N study of the efficacy of military threats, and one which focuses explicitly on deterrent threats, we turn to the Russett-Huth research programme on extended deterrence. The comparative analysis is conducted without the use of formal statistical methods. It is found that the effectiveness of deterrent threats is unaffected by the size of the pawn, the existence of a formal commitment by the defender, or the strategic or local balance of military capabilities, though equality on at least one military dimension is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a deterrence success. Deterrent threats by democratic regimes are slightly less credible than those of non-democratic regimes. Some level of military co-operation between defender and pawn appears to be a necessary condition for successful deterrence, but it is not sufficient. The existence of political ties is 'helpful if not essential', and economic interdependence is 'virtually essential' to successful deterrence. Russett then attempts to identify the factors associated with the defender's decision whether or not to go to war to defend the pawn once it has been attacked. Neither the size of the pawn, the military balance, nor the nature of the defender's regime has much of an impact on the defender's response, but bonds of economic, political and military interdependence are quite important (as they were for the attacker's actions). Russett gives great emphasis to these bonds between defender and pawn, and suggests that strengthening these ties is a means for the defender to increase the credibility of his deterrent threats. He fails to acknowledge, however, that increasing ties between defender and pawn to reinforce commitment and credibility may involve substantial costs. 33 Russett also presents an expected-utility model (though he does not refer to it in those terms) to explain the actions of both attacker and defender, though this model appears in footnotes and is not fully integrated into the analysis as a whole. The defender will pursue a 'firm' policy and attempt to deter the adversary if his prospective gains from successful deterrence, weighted by the probability of success and discounted by the cost and probability of war, exceed the losses of retreat (the failure to issue a deterrent threat). The adversary will attack in spite of the deterrent threat if (and only if) the expected value of attacking (as determined by the probability that the defender will not respond and the benefits of an uncountered attack and the cost and probability of war resulting from an attack which is resisted) exceeds the value of the status quo.34
It would be useful to note some of the limitations of Russett's study, though some of these are corrected in subsequent work. First, Russett's theoretical discussion is weakened by framing the question in terms of the credibility of the threat. Credibility is an intervening perceptual variable which may help explain, 32 Russett, 'Calculus of Deterrence', p. 98. 33 Russett, 'Calculus of Deterrence', pp. 100-6. 34 Russett, 'Calculus of Deterrence', pp. 105-7. cent alliance, recent occupation, close ideological ties, etc.); and economic interdependence between defender and pawn (relative proportion of imports and exports). The dependent variable is deterrence success or failure, with success defined as 'an instance when an attack on the pawn is prevented or repulsed without conflict between the attacking forces and regular combat units of the major power defender'.32
The comparative analysis is conducted without the use of formal statistical methods. It is found that the effectiveness of deterrent threats is unaffected by the size of the pawn, the existence of a formal commitment by the defender, or the strategic or local balance of military capabilities, though equality on at least one military dimension is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a deterrence success. Deterrent threats by democratic regimes are slightly less credible than those of non-democratic regimes. Some level of military co-operation between defender and pawn appears to be a necessary condition for successful deterrence, but it is not sufficient. The existence of political ties is 'helpful if not essential', and economic interdependence is 'virtually essential' to successful deterrence. Russett then attempts to identify the factors associated with the defender's decision whether or not to go to war to defend the pawn once it has been attacked. Neither the size of the pawn, the military balance, nor the nature of the defender's regime has much of an impact on the defender's response, but bonds of economic, political and military interdependence are quite important (as they were for the attacker's actions). Russett gives great emphasis to these bonds between defender and pawn, and suggests that strengthening these ties is a means for the defender to increase the credibility of his deterrent threats. He fails to acknowledge, however, that increasing ties between defender and pawn to reinforce commitment and credibility may involve substantial costs. 33 Russett also presents an expected-utility model (though he does not refer to it in those terms) to explain the actions of both attacker and defender, though this model appears in footnotes and is not fully integrated into the analysis as a whole. The defender will pursue a 'firm' policy and attempt to deter the adversary if his prospective gains from successful deterrence, weighted by the probability of success and discounted by the cost and probability of war, exceed the losses of retreat (the failure to issue a deterrent threat). The adversary will attack in spite of the deterrent threat if (and only if) the expected value of attacking (as determined by the probability that the defender will not respond and the benefits of an uncountered attack and the cost and probability of war resulting from an attack which is resisted) exceeds the value of the status quo.34
It would be useful to note some of the limitations of Russett's study, though some of these are corrected in subsequent work. First, Russett's theoretical discussion is weakened by framing the question in terms of the credibility of the threat. Credibility is an intervening perceptual variable which may help explain, 32 The more general theoretical problem is the treatment of the dispute outcome (success/failure) as a dichotomous variable, whereas George and Smoke argue persuasively that deterrence can fail in a variety of different ways and that the initiator can often 'design around' a deterrence threat. Though George and Smoke are undoubtedly correct on the theoretical level, I believe that for the purposes of a large-N correlational study the dichotomous classification of the dependent variable is a reasonable first approximation, but one which ought to be refined in subsequent research.
Perhaps an even more serious problem with defining deterrence success is that the very concept implies a causal relationship, that the potential aggressor does not attack the pawn because of the defender's threat. The mere observation of non-attack is necessary but not sufficient to demonstrate the success of a deterrent threat. One must also show that in the absence of such a threat the adversary would have attacked the pawn, and that the adversary was dissuaded by the defender's threat rather than something else (such as his domestic public opinion, anticipated diplomatic reaction, ability of the pawn to mount a successful or at least costly defence, etc.). The more general theoretical problem is the treatment of the dispute outcome (success/failure) as a dichotomous variable, whereas George and Smoke argue persuasively that deterrence can fail in a variety of different ways and that the initiator can often 'design around' a deterrence threat. Though George and Smoke are undoubtedly correct on the theoretical level, I believe that for the purposes of a large-N correlational study the dichotomous classification of the dependent variable is a reasonable first approximation, but one which ought to be refined in subsequent research.
Perhaps an even more serious problem with defining deterrence success is that the very concept implies a causal relationship, that the potential aggressor does not attack the pawn because of the defender's threat. The mere observation of non-attack is necessary but not sufficient to demonstrate the success of a deterrent threat. One must also show that in the absence of such a threat the adversary would have attacked the pawn, and that the adversary was dissuaded by the defender's threat rather than something else (such as his domestic public opinion, anticipated diplomatic reaction, ability of the pawn to mount a successful or at least costly defence, etc.). One of the main purposes of the Pearl Harbor study was to explore and validate some of the empirical associations uncovered in the earlier correlational analysis. Russett's earlier expected-utility model is used as a framework for the theoretical interpretation of Japan's decision for war. In spite of the absence of an explicit American deterrent threat, Russett argues, Japanese decision makers were fully convinced that the United States would respond militarily to a Japanese attack on Malaya and especially the Dutch East Indies because of the strategic and economic value of those colonies. This is consistent with Russett's earlier argument that military, political and economic ties reinforce commitment in a way that formal threats do not. 43 The fact that the Japanese perceived the US threat to be highly credible but attacked anyway demonstrates the fallacy (in Russett's 1963 study) 44 Russett, 'Pearl Harbor', pp. 96-9. 45 Russett classifies this case as a deterrent failure, but in fact it involved the backfiring of a strategy of compellence as much as the failure of deterrence. The United States attempted not only to deter the Japanese from moving into Southeast Asia but also to compel them to withdraw from China, and used a highly coercive oil embargo to enforce that policy. 46 In the nuclear age the option of a direct attack against a major power defender rather than its pawn is unlikely to be very attractive. theoretical interpretation of Japan's decision for war. In spite of the absence of an explicit American deterrent threat, Russett argues, Japanese decision makers were fully convinced that the United States would respond militarily to a Japanese attack on Malaya and especially the Dutch East Indies because of the strategic and economic value of those colonies. This is consistent with Russett's earlier argument that military, political and economic ties reinforce commitment in a way that formal threats do not. 43 The fact that the Japanese perceived the US threat to be highly credible but attacked anyway demonstrates the fallacy (in Russett's 1963 study) 44 Russett, 'Pearl Harbor', pp. 96-9. 45 Russett classifies this case as a deterrent failure, but in fact it involved the backfiring of a strategy of compellence as much as the failure of deterrence. The United States attempted not only to deter the Japanese from moving into Southeast Asia but also to compel them to withdraw from China, and used a highly coercive oil embargo to enforce that policy. 46 In the nuclear age the option of a direct attack against a major power defender rather than its pawn is unlikely to be very attractive. theoretical interpretation of Japan's decision for war. In spite of the absence of an explicit American deterrent threat, Russett argues, Japanese decision makers were fully convinced that the United States would respond militarily to a Japanese attack on Malaya and especially the Dutch East Indies because of the strategic and economic value of those colonies. This is consistent with Russett's earlier argument that military, political and economic ties reinforce commitment in a way that formal threats do not. 43 The fact that the Japanese perceived the US threat to be highly credible but attacked anyway demonstrates the fallacy (in Russett's 1963 study) 58 Huth and Russett, 'After Deterrence Fails'. Only the statistically significant (at p = 0.10) probit coefficients are reported, so I must rely on the authors' interpretation of the results. 59 The authors acknowledge that the generalizability of this finding is restricted by the limited number of cases involved (eighteen with nuclear defenders, four with overt nuclear threats). 60 One possible explanation is that the defender's bargaining strategy is a function of the extent of defender-protege bonds (i.e., the stronger the ties the more coercive the bargaining), with the resulting multicollinearity accounting for the drop in significance of defender-protege bonds. The correlation between these two variables is not reported in the article, though I have been informed ( Applying probit analysis to the data, Huth and Russett find that successful deterrence is associated with an immediate or short-term balance of forces favouring the defender (p < 0.05), with the long-term balance being only weakly associated with the outcome.58 The defender's possession of nuclear weapons, or an overt threat to use them, has no impact on the outcome of the crisis.59 In the most surprising finding, and one contrary to the central result of the 1963 and 1984 studies, economic and political-military ties between defender and prot&eg are found to be unrelated to the success or failure of deterrence. Unfortunately, the authors make little effort to explain this dramatic change from their previous studies, though they do assert that it derives from the introduction of crisis bargaining variables into the analysis.60 These bargaining variables are found to be significantly correlated with the success or failure of deterrence. As hypothesized, reciprocal strategies are found to be associated with successful outcomes. Deterrence is likely to succeed if the defender follows a firm-but-fair diplomatic strategy, and likely to fail for defenders following conciliatory or bullying strategies (p < 0.01). Similarly, tit-for-tat policies of military actions are usually successful, whereas excessively firm or cautious policies are not (p < 0.025).61
Another finding that runs contrary to the results of the 1984 study is that the outcome of a crisis is associated with the reputation of the defender, defined here as its behaviour in the last crisis against the same adversary.62 Both backing question (the importance of which would be rejected by expected utility theory) is whether the initiator, having made the threat, conceives of a prospective retreat as a retreatfrom the status quo or a retreat to the status quo. That is, would a retreat be seen as a loss or the absence of a gain. This question of how the decision is framed may be critical. There is substantial evidence in social psychology that more weight is given to losses than to gains and that individuals are risk-acceptant when faced with losses and risk-averse when faced with gains. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk', Econometrica, 47 (1979), 273-91. 58 Huth and Russett, 'After Deterrence Fails'. Only the statistically significant (at p = 0.10) probit coefficients are reported, so I must rely on the authors' interpretation of the results. 59 The authors acknowledge that the generalizability of this finding is restricted by the limited number of cases involved (eighteen with nuclear defenders, four with overt nuclear threats). 60 One possible explanation is that the defender's bargaining strategy is a function of the extent of defender-protege bonds (i.e., the stronger the ties the more coercive the bargaining), with the resulting multicollinearity accounting for the drop in significance of defender-protege bonds. The correlation between these two variables is not reported in the article, though I have been informed ( Applying probit analysis to the data, Huth and Russett find that successful deterrence is associated with an immediate or short-term balance of forces favouring the defender (p < 0.05), with the long-term balance being only weakly associated with the outcome.58 The defender's possession of nuclear weapons, or an overt threat to use them, has no impact on the outcome of the crisis.59 In the most surprising finding, and one contrary to the central result of the 1963 and 1984 studies, economic and political-military ties between defender and prot&eg are found to be unrelated to the success or failure of deterrence. Unfortunately, the authors make little effort to explain this dramatic change from their previous studies, though they do assert that it derives from the introduction of crisis bargaining variables into the analysis.60 These bargaining variables are found to be significantly correlated with the success or failure of deterrence. As hypothesized, reciprocal strategies are found to be associated with successful outcomes. Deterrence is likely to succeed if the defender follows a firm-but-fair diplomatic strategy, and likely to fail for defenders following conciliatory or bullying strategies (p < 0.01). Similarly, tit-for-tat policies of military actions are usually successful, whereas excessively firm or cautious policies are not (p < 0.025).61
Another finding that runs contrary to the results of the 1984 study is that the outcome of a crisis is associated with the reputation of the defender, defined here as its behaviour in the last crisis against the same adversary.62 Both backing question (the importance of which would be rejected by expected utility theory) is whether the initiator, having made the threat, conceives of a prospective retreat as a retreatfrom the status quo or a retreat to the status quo. That is, would a retreat be seen as a loss or the absence of a gain. This question of how the decision is framed may be critical. There is substantial evidence in social psychology that more weight is given to losses than to gains and that individuals are risk-acceptant when faced with losses and risk-averse when faced with gains. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk', Econometrica, 47 (1979), 273-91. 58 Huth and Russett, 'After Deterrence Fails'. Only the statistically significant (at p = 0.10) probit coefficients are reported, so I must rely on the authors' interpretation of the results. 59 The authors acknowledge that the generalizability of this finding is restricted by the limited number of cases involved (eighteen with nuclear defenders, four with overt nuclear threats). 60 One possible explanation is that the defender's bargaining strategy is a function of the extent of defender-protege bonds (i.e., the stronger the ties the more coercive the bargaining), with the resulting multicollinearity accounting for the drop in significance of defender-protege bonds. The correlation between these two variables is not reported in the article, though I have been informed (Huth, private correspondence) that correlations between bargaining behaviour and defender-protege bonds (economic ties and arms transfers) are very low (0.08 and 0.15, respectively), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem. Huth and Russett conclude that the attacker's decision appears to be based primarily on short-term considerations, particularly military ones, and that long-term military power avails little. What is important is the defender's ability to prevent a quick seizure of territory or to roll back that seizure relatively promptly, not the threat of future retaliation. They infer from this that deterrence by denial is more critical than deterrence by punishment for immediate extended deterrence. 65 Now let us consider the conditions affecting the defender's decision to go to war in the event that deterrence fails. The model correctly postdicts 83 per cent of these cases (n = 24). The short-term balance of military forces in being is statistically significant, and the long-term balance is nearly significant. The defender's ties with the protege are also important, particularly formal alliances and geographical proximity. Crisis bargaining behaviour is statistically significant (p = 0.10).
Thus several factors which appear to be important in the attacker's decision whether or not to defy a deterrent threat are relatively unimportant or less im- 63 Leng finds that while reciprocating strategies tend to work best, states tend to adopt more coercive bargaining strategies in successive crises against the same adversary. The diplomatic victor in one dispute tends to utilize the same (successful) influence strategy in the next crisis with the same adversary, unless the adversary adopted a more coercive strategy, in which case (and only under such conditions) the previous winner would also adopt a more coercive strategy. The loser, assuming that its diplomatic defeat was due to the failure to demonstrate sufficient resolve, tends to adopt a more coercive strategy in the next crisis. A diplomatic compromise tends to result in more coercive influence strategies by both parties in the next crisis. Crises ending in war tend to result in more coercive strategies in the next crisis unless a state perceives that the war had been 'unwanted' (i.e., one's behaviour was overly coercive, leading the adversary to preempt), in which case a more accommodative strategy is adopted. See Leng, 'When Will They Ever Learn?' 64 This finding raises another question. If'stalemate' is defined as a possible outcome of previous crises, utilized in the statistical analysis, and found to be associated with successful deterrence in a current crisis, that is not made explicit in this study. And if outcomes can be adequately measured trichotomously for use as an independent variable predicting to behaviour and outcomes in the next crisis, this new measure should be utilized as the dependent variable in all crises, replacing the problematic success/failure dichotomy. A technical methodological point is also in order. Statistical inference generally requires the independence of cases. If the outcome of one case is affected by the outcome of the previous case, the assumption of independence is violated, and more sophisticated statistical procedures are normally required. 65 On the distinction between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961). down and prevailing in the last crisis against the same adversary are associated with the failure of deterrence, which leads Huth and Russett to conclude that 'a stalemate is a safer outcome'.63 This conclusion, however, must be regarded with a certain amount of scepticism in the absence of further research. The sensitivity of many of these empirical findings to relatively minor changes in the operationalizations of certain variables or to the addition of new variables is one ground for caution. In addition, the failure to examine alternative explanations for the selection of different bargaining strategies raises the possibility of spurious inferences regarding the causal impact of these strategies. 64 Huth and Russett conclude that the attacker's decision appears to be based primarily on short-term considerations, particularly military ones, and that long-term military power avails little. What is important is the defender's ability to prevent a quick seizure of territory or to roll back that seizure relatively promptly, not the threat of future retaliation. They infer from this that deterrence by denial is more critical than deterrence by punishment for immediate extended deterrence. 65 Now let us consider the conditions affecting the defender's decision to go to war in the event that deterrence fails. The model correctly postdicts 83 per cent of these cases (n = 24). The short-term balance of military forces in being is statistically significant, and the long-term balance is nearly significant. The defender's ties with the protege are also important, particularly formal alliances and geographical proximity. Crisis bargaining behaviour is statistically significant (p = 0.10).
Thus several factors which appear to be important in the attacker's decision whether or not to defy a deterrent threat are relatively unimportant or less im- 63 Leng finds that while reciprocating strategies tend to work best, states tend to adopt more coercive bargaining strategies in successive crises against the same adversary. The diplomatic victor in one dispute tends to utilize the same (successful) influence strategy in the next crisis with the same adversary, unless the adversary adopted a more coercive strategy, in which case (and only under such conditions) the previous winner would also adopt a more coercive strategy. The loser, assuming that its diplomatic defeat was due to the failure to demonstrate sufficient resolve, tends to adopt a more coercive strategy in the next crisis. A diplomatic compromise tends to result in more coercive influence strategies by both parties in the next crisis. Crises ending in war tend to result in more coercive strategies in the next crisis unless a state perceives that the war had been 'unwanted' (i.e., one's behaviour was overly coercive, leading the adversary to preempt), in which case a more accommodative strategy is adopted. See Leng, 'When Will They Ever Learn?' 64 This finding raises another question. If'stalemate' is defined as a possible outcome of previous crises, utilized in the statistical analysis, and found to be associated with successful deterrence in a current crisis, that is not made explicit in this study. And if outcomes can be adequately measured trichotomously for use as an independent variable predicting to behaviour and outcomes in the next crisis, this new measure should be utilized as the dependent variable in all crises, replacing the problematic success/failure dichotomy. A technical methodological point is also in order. Statistical inference generally requires the independence of cases. If the outcome of one case is affected by the outcome of the previous case, the assumption of independence is violated, and more sophisticated statistical procedures are normally required. 65 On the distinction between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961). portant in the defender's decision whether to fight in the event that deterrence fails. Whereas the attacker is influenced by immediate and short-term military considerations and by its adversary's reputation and bargaining strategy, and basically undeterred by political-military and economic ties between defender and protege, the defender is more influenced by long-term military considerations and defender-protege bonds. It is less influenced by its own past behaviour, by the nature of the bargaining process or by short-term military considerations. The fact that the decisions of the attacker and defender are influenced by such different criteria increases their insensitivity to the cost-benefit calculations made by the other and thus increases the likelihood of a conflict spiral driven by misperceptions. States are particularly likely to underestimate the costs of retreating to the adversary, and the failure of the attacker to consider the value to the defender of economic and political-military ties between defender and protege is potentially a critical factor contributing to war. 66 empirically by systematic quantitative analysis as well as by case-study methods. In addition, some of the findings from quantitative empirical studies represent interesting theoretical anomalies and ought to stimulate additional theoretical analysis. The broader literature on deterrence provides a useful model of how formal theoretical, quantitative empirical and case-study methodologies can supplement each other to enhance our understanding of important theoretical questions with undeniable implications for contemporary international security. 
